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This  paper  addresses  the  question  of  financial  constraints  in  Ukrainian  agriculture  in 
transition. The main objective is to reveal the evidence of the both phenomena, soft budget 
constraints and credit rationing, investigating investment behaviour of large farms in Ukraine. 
Our  empirical  analysis  is  based  on  unbalanced  panel  data  containing  529  agricultural 
enterprises  from  three  Ukrainian  regions  between  2001  and  2005.  Estimates  of  the  Euler 
investment equation for several sub-samples reveal a dissimilar level of financial constraints. 
We confirm the presence of the soft financial environment (soft budget constraints) for the 
Ukrainian large farms being in an unconstrained financial regime. The farms belong to this 
regime if they receive credits after being unprofitable in two consecutive years. The other 
farms defined a priori as being in an constrained financial regime face evidence of credit 
rationing.  With  regard  to  the  empirical  results,  we  derive  macroeconomic  implications  of 
financial constraints in the agriculture of Ukraine. 
Keywords:  transition  agriculture,  investment,  soft  budget  constraints,  credit  rationing, 
Ukraine 
1  INTRODUCTION 
Economic literature broadly approved that investment is an important constituent of firms’ 
structural  change.  The  need  of  structural  development  is  particularly  high  in  transition 
countries but capital required for necessary investments is characterised by difficult access. 
Since equity capital has been lacking, debt is a main source of financing. However, even 
capital  markets  mainly  represented  by  bank-oriented  systems  are  still  underdeveloped  in 
transition countries. For instance, banks are often undercapitalised, only a low number of loan 
contracts exists, and a lack in non-banking financial institutions is present. Therefore, the 
supply  of  external  capital  to  finance  ongoing  investment  does  not  meet  the  high  capital 
demand.  As  a  consequence,  potential  investment  is  hindered  and  structural  change  slows 
down.  In  this  paper  we  highlight  the  current  status  of  financing  and  investment  in  the 
agricultural  sector  of  Ukraine.  Several  Ukrainian  politicians  and  scientists  affirm  that  the 
agricultural  enterprises  cannot  borrow  at  the  market  interest  rate.  These  experts  call  for 
government subsidies and for creation of state-owned fund organisations. Other experts argue 
that  this  would  not  solve  the  problems  of  rural  finance.  They  point  out  the  following 
weaknesses of newly restructured large farms: low profitability, high production and market 
risks, significant transaction costs, and lack of collateral (STRIEWE et al. 2001a). The problem 
is also aggravated by the weaknesses of the banking sector in Ukraine, indicated by a slow 
institutional change, lack of efficient credit registration, non-transparent accounting system, 
and imperfections of bankruptcy procedures and banking law (STRIEWE et al. 2001b). For all 
that, we do not pretend to give here an unequivocal answer as to whether the financial support 
of  Ukrainian  agriculture  should  be  strengthened,  changed  or  even  remain.  Our  aim  is  to 
investigate empirically the relationship between investment and financing in Ukrainian large 
farms. As previous studies are mainly  based on descriptive techniques, there is  a lack in 
explaining  the  investment-financing  relationship  in  Ukrainian  agriculture  with  a  stronger 
theoretical background. Such findings may be useful in forecasting possible macroeconomic 
implications of financial constraints in economic transition.  
The new institutional theory is commonly applied for explaining the investment decisions 
under imperfect capital markets. Within this approach, two opposite hypotheses can be found 
with regard as to how investment and financing opportunities are related in transition process.  
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The first one, credit rationing theory (STIGLITZ and WEISS 1981), is based on the presence of 
information  asymmetries  in  the  lender-borrower  relationship.  Thus,  firms’  demand  for 
external funds of capital is confronted with a small supply. Firms are not able to borrow the 
desired amount of capital despite their willingness to pay the current interest rate. Being credit 
rationed,  firms  face  an  underinvestment  problem  during  economic  transition.  Empirical 
applications of credit rationing theory and capital market imperfections are comprehensively 
reviewed in HUBBARD (1998) and in PETRICK (2005). The second theoretical approach, the 
concept of soft budget constraints, SBC (KORNAI et al. 2003), focuses on the state bailing-
outs  for  unprofitable  enterprises  with  subsidies,  credits,  tax  privileges,  and  other  policy 
instruments. Under soft macroeconomic conditions, firms’ investment rates are comparably 
high as capital access is increased due to public support. The SBC phenomenon in former 
socialist  countries  is  caused  by  government  paternalistic  objectives  in  order  to  provide 
economic and social stability after the beginning of transition.  
Capital market imperfections due to asymmetric information or agency problems (JENSEN and 
MECKLING 1976) should cause a wedge between the costs of external and internal financing. 
Provided that investments are only sensitive to internal funds if there are financial constraints, 
it  is  common  to  include  the  firms’  cash  flow  into  the  investment  equation  as  a  standard 
indicator of internal sources (FAZZARI et al. 1988). If the firm’s opportunity cost of internal 
funds are substantially lower than its cost of external finance, investment-cash flow sensitivity 
rises  with  increasing  cost  wedge.  The  negative  or  non-significant  cash  flow-investment 
relationship is usually interpreted as evidence of perfect capital markets. This means that the 
firm’s internal and external funds are perfect substitutes. Accordingly, there is need to clarify 
whether  such  a  negative  relationship  can  argue  for  perfect  capital  markets  in  transition 
economies, or is it a signal of soft budget constraints. Several authors deal with empirical 
investigation on financial constraints in post-socialist transition countries. LIZAL and SVEJNAR 
(2002)  clarify  the  investment  sensitivity  to  financial  constraints  in  Czech  industry.  The 
authors point out a positive relationship between financial measures and investment which 
indicates evidence of credit rationing. Under perfect capital markets, this coefficient should be 
negative or, more likely, null or non-significant. In a transition economy, the null signals that 
the firms access to bank loans does not correlate with their efficiency (i.e. SBC are possible). 
The negative coefficient means a strong evidence of SBC because firms potentially have an 
unlimited  loan  access.  On  the  contrary,  HANOUSEK  and  FILER  (2004)  interpret  a  positive 
coefficient on financing-investment relationship as a sign of attractive investment alternatives. 
Firms with low profits, which invested on average more, are classified as ‘not financially 
unconstrained’.  As  the  latter  finding  simply  points  out  a  need  of  additional  structural 
transformations, the SBC hypothesis is rejected in this paper. To our knowledge, there are 
only few SBC studies related to the lagged transition economies of the former Soviet Union. 
E.g.,  BEZLEPKINA  and  OUDE  LANSINK  (2003)  analyse  the  impact  of  capital  structure  on 
efficiency of large farms in Russia. Their special attention is paid to credits and subsidies that 
may  weaken  the  optimising  behaviour  of  the  unprofitable  enterprises.  Consequently,  the 
authors argue for hardening SBC.  
Empirical studies about the investment-financing relationship in economic transition mainly 
focus  on  either  credit  rationing  and  soft  budget  constraints  across  industry  enterprises. 
However, there is a lack in applications of these theoretical concepts when explaining the 
impact of financial constraints on investment in the agricultural sector, which still plays an 
important  role  in  transition  economies  lagging  behind.  Our  paper  addresses  therefore  the 
following  questions:  (i)  What  are  the  latest  ideas  in  interpreting  investment-financing 
relationship  during  the  ‘stop-and-go’  transition  in  Ukrainian  agriculture?  (ii)  Are  the 
Ukrainian farms really financially constrained, or is there evidence of soft budget constraints  
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at least for a few of those farms? (iii) What are the macroeconomic implications of financial 
constraints in the agriculture of Ukraine? We suggest that SBC are still present in large farms 
in  Ukraine  that  have  inherited  good  relationships  with  the  authorities  and  financial 
institutions. The evidence of SBC is empirically analysed in the large farm sector in three 
Ukrainian  regions  representing  different  environmental  and  economic  conditions  of 
agricultural production. For this purpose we provide an econometric estimation of a Euler 
investment equation conjecturing that SBC farms reveal less sensitivity of investment to the 
capital structure.  
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  In  the  second  section,  we  explain 
common  tendencies  of  investment  and  financing  in  Ukrainian  agriculture.  The  third  part 
provides  a  structural  model  of  investment  using  the  Euler  equation  approach.  Estimation 
methodology and data are discussed in the fourth section. The fifth part consists of empirical 
results and discussion on macroeconomic implications of the financial constraints. The final 
section concludes. 
2  INVESTMENT AND FINANCING DRAWBACKS IN UKRAINIAN AGRICULTURE  
For a better understanding of the current situation with investment and finance, we briefly 
resume  some  historical  facts.  Transition  process  in  Ukrainian  agricultural  sector  can  be 
characterised  by  two  main  phases  of  agricultural  reform:  the  period  from  1991-1999, 
dominated by large soviet-style enterprises, and after 1999, with newly established small and 
medium sized farms. SEDIK et al. (2000) show that between 1991 and 1999 the bank credits to 
the agriculture sector were often replaced by the so-called ‘commercial’ credits, i.e. prolonged 
obligations to suppliers, customers, and the state. The government supported farms through 
write-offs of old debts, state orders, and state commodity credits. However, old persistent 
farms  structures,  without  completed  property  rights  reform  and  under  lacking  internal 
financial  discipline,  discouraged  the  farm  management  from  new  investments.  Despite  an 
increasing number of emerging small farms, the large enterprises, former state and collective 
farms, remain most important because of traditionally land intensive farming in Ukraine and 
attitudes of the government to maintain the control over agricultural production (SWINNEN 
2006). Consequently, the current investment share of Ukrainian agriculture in the national 
economy sways at five percent level compared to 16 percent at the very beginning of the 
nineties (see table 1). The annual machinery depreciation exceeds ten times the replacement 
machinery investment. Only a small part of the cash flow is used for investments, whilst the 
major part is spent for variable inputs. The absolute sum of on-farm investment increased 
slightly first from the beginning of this decade. The question arises whether the investment 
restraints should be put down to the weak market-oriented motivation of newly established 
agricultural structures and incompetence of the farms’ managers, or are financial constraints a 
major factor influencing the farms’ investment behaviour. 
 
 
Table 1:  Investment in Ukrainian agriculture related to the other economic fields
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1991-1995  30316  4853  16.0  1726  5.7  100.0  100.0  100.0 
1996-2000  12462  690  5.5  756  6.1  41.1  14.2  43.8 
2001-2005  28761  1542  5.4  2408  8.4  94.9  31.8  139.5 
Notes:
  1in national comparison prices, developed and introduced by the State Statistical Committee of Ukraine; 
comparison year is 2000; 
2 UAH is the abbreviation for Ukrainian currency; 
3annual average level  
Source:  Ukrainian Academy of Agricultural Sciences 2005, State Statistical Committee of Ukraine 2007    
Main barriers in receiving bank credits are high interest rates, lacking collateral in form of 
plant and equipment, and complicated bureaucratic procedures. Moreover, agricultural land 
that  is  under  the  moratorium  on  sale  until  2008  cannot  be  used  as  a  collateral.  Further 
important factors of the low credit supply are short credit history and imperfect information 
about  potential  borrowers.  Agriculture  receives  about  16  percent  of  the  total  bank  credit 
volume in Ukraine (CHAPKO 2003). Even so, the issued loans cover only 50 percent of the 
credit demand for variable inputs, and two percent for long-term debt. The banks contribute 
about a half of the external financial resources received by the agricultural enterprises. The 
remaining  parts  are  credits  from  input  suppliers,  processing  industry,  leasing  companies, 
credit unions, and other corporate and private enterprises. On the other hand, the farm debt 
problem is often called a ‘chimera’ (SEDIK 2003) because the gap in financing Ukrainian large 
farms seems not to be lacking debt but lacking profits. Low profits are explained to appear 
from public policy instruments that rather hamper economic reforms, despite their ‘good’ 
intentions. Those are subsidies for input and output purchases, agricultural tax and import 
tariff discounts, local trade regulations etc. However, in this chapter we do not aim at precise 
response  on  the  question  whether  the  Ukrainian  large  farms  are  constrained  or  not.  The 
mainly  descriptive  literature  on  financing  problems  in  agriculture  of  Ukraine  is  often 
ambiguous  in  attempts  to  find  unique  answer  to  this  question.  From  our  viewpoint  it  is 
because of lacking empirical analysis on investment-financing relationship in the large farm 
sector. 
3  MODELLING INVESTMENT UNDER FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS  
The Euler equation approach is commonly applied in investment literature and based on the 
equality between the marginal product of capital and the cost of capital including marginal 
adjustment costs of investing now and marginal costs of investing in the next period (WHITED 
1992). This marginal condition allows to take into account financial constraint expressed as 
the increasing cost of debt in the case of growing leverage (BOND and MEGHIR 1994). RIZOV 
(2004) derives the model of investment in transition from the first order conditions for a 
profit-maximising  firm  under  perfect  capital  market  conditions,  where  equity  capital  and 
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(1) 
Here  t V  is the discounted maximised value of firm dividends.  t E  is expectation at time t,  t d  
are dividend payments, and  (.) t p  is the profit function.  1 - t K  represents the beginning-of-
period capital stock,  t L  is vector of variable inputs,  t I  is investment, and  t r  is interest rate. 
                                                 
1 We refused to use the index i for number of a firm before dealing with an empirical Euler equation and panel 
data set.  
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1 - t D  denotes the beginning-of-period debt,  t B  is the new borrowing,  t R  are repayments.  t d  
and  t R  are minimum dividend payments and minimum repayments, respectively, and  d  is 
the  depreciation  rate.  The  transaction  costs  ) ( t B g   associated  with  new  borrowing  (e.g. 
arrangement  and  commission  fees)  are  assumed  to  be  proportional  to  the  debt  volume: 
t t B B g g = ) ( . Referring to RIZOV (2004), the minimum level of dividend payments may be set 

































If  1 ® q  it implies that the firm is long-term forward looking. If  0 ® q  the firm faces rather 
unstable  economic  conditions,  which  results  in a  higher  rate  of  return.  The  maximisation 
function given in (1) can be rewritten as a dynamic programming problem
2:  
{ t t t t t t t t t t
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s. t.:  t t t t t t t t t t t d R B B D r I L I K ³ - - + - + - - - - g d p 1 1 1 ) , , ) 1 (( ;  and  0 ³ t B , 
where  1 - t K  and 1 - t D  are state variables.  
The empirical specification of the firm investment model
3 follows after defining the profit 
function  (.) t p  as: 
t
I
t t t t t t t t t t I p L w K I G p L K F p - - - = ) , ( ) , ( p ,  (4) 
where  t w  denotes the price of variable factor inputs,  t p  the output price, and 
I
t p  the price of 
investment goods.  ) , ( t t L K F  is assumed to be a linear homogeneous production function with 
constant returns to scale, and  ) , ( t t K I G  quadratic adjustment cost function which is linearly 
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(5) 
Here, a  is an adjustment cost parameter, and  b  is a ‘normal’ rate of investment (WHITED 
1992). This functional form does not refer to possible irreversibility of investment decisions 
and builds on theoretical statement that firms minimise their adjustment cost if  b  is close to 
the average investment-capital ratio. To allow for imperfect competition, we assume that the 
output  price  t p   depends  on  output.  Because  the  net  observable  output  function 
) , ( ) , ( ) , , ( t t t t t t t K I G L K F I L K Y - =  is also linearly homogeneous, it follows: 
                                                 
2 Detailed derivation of the Euler investment equation with transaction costs, dividend repayment constraint and 
borrowing constraint can be found in RIZOV (2004). 
3 BOND and MEGHIR (1994) derive the Euler investment equation from the first order conditions for a standard 
profit-maximising firm in a perfect capital market and after evaluation of the expectation at realised values: 
1 1 1 1 ) / ( ) / ( ) / ( ) 1 ( + + + + + ¶ ¶ - ¶ ¶ - = ¶ ¶ - - t t t t t t t t K I I e p p p q d ,  where  1 + t e   is  an  expectation  error  term.  This 
equality presents the model without transaction costs and thus no different financial status across firms. These 
costs should be introduced through equation (3) in order to account for financial regimes that potentially occur 
























































































Furthermore, the marginal product of variable factors  L F ¶ ¶ /  is approximated by  t t p w / , 
without specifying a parametric form of the production function. The first term in equation 
(6b) expresses the relative operating profit that highly correlates with relative cash flow (CF). 




1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 +























































t t t t r p p p p r p J + + - + = + + d . 
1 + t f  denotes a firm-specific real discount factor on new investment, and  t J  reflects the user 
(opportunity) costs of capital. As we do not attempt to estimate  t J  directly, this term can be 
replaced  in  the  empirical  equation  by  firm  and  time  specific  effects.  Furthermore,  we 
introduce two additional variables into the model specification. The first is the output-capital 
ratio  eliminated  from  the  Euler  equation  under  perfect  market  competition;  otherwise  the 
coefficient on this term controlling for imperfect competition as well as non-constant returns 
to scale should be positive. The second one is the squared debt-to-capital ratio that accounts 
for the inseparability of investment and borrowing decisions. The debt parameter is excluded 
under the debt irrelevance theorem of Modigliani-Miller and could otherwise be quadratic and 

































































                                                                                                                      t i t i s q , e + + + ,  (8) 
where  t i K I , ) / (  is the investment-capital ratio of the firm i in the period t,  1 , ) / ( - t i K I  is lagged 
investment-capital ratio, and 
2
1 , ) / ( - t i K I  is lagged squared investment-capital ratio indicating 
the speed of investment adjustment.  1 , ) / ( - t i K CF represents lagged cash-flow-to-capital ratio, 
1 , ) / ( - t i K Y  is lagged output-capital ratio, and 
2
1 , ) / ( - t i K D  stands for lagged squared debt-to-
capital  ratio.  i q   and  t s   reflect  respective  farm  and  time  specific  effects,  and  t i, e   are 
composite error terms assumed to be iid.  
Under the null hypothesis of perfect capital markets,  0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 5 4 3 2 1 = ³ £ - £ ³ b b b b b .   
It  can  be  shown  that  1 / ) 1 ( 1 1 ³ + = + t b f b   if 0 ³ b and    1 1 £ + t f ;  1 / 1 1 2 - £ - = + t b f     if 
1 1 £ + t f ,  and  0 / 1 1 3 < - = + t b af if  0 > a and  1 1 £ + t f . 
In order to incorporate the empirical implications of the credit rationing and SBC theories into 
the  econometric  model,  we  should  find  sensitivity  of  investment  to  measures  of  internal 
finance. The theoretical model implies that under perfect capital market hypothesis, a farm 
can raise as much finance as desired at a given cost of capital. If this assumption is incorrect 
then the cash flow term may reflect liquidity constraints. Usually it holds that a positive cash 
flow coefficient in estimated Euler equation ( 0 3 > b ) notices binding liquidity constraints, i.e.  
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existence of credit rationing
4. More questionable is the interpretation of the non-positive or 
null coefficient of the financial variable. In transition economy, a significant non-positive 
cash flow parameter ( 0 3 £ b ) may indicate the evidence of soft budget constraints as soon as 
firms  do  not  rely  on  equity  capital.  This  soft  financial  environment  exists  because  of 
preferential financial treatments provided by the government.  
Accounting for the investment-financing relationship in a simple linear fashion presented in 
equation (8) is obviously inadequate because of the non-linearity implied by the financial 
regimes. However, it is possible to identify ex ante potentially constrained firms, but it is 
almost impossible to identify the exact years during which a farm is constrained. Thus, it is 
difficult  to  differentiate  between  firm-specific  effects  on  investment  and  the  effects  of 
financial constraints (KAPLAN and ZINGALES 1997), which requires to determine exogenously 
the premium on external finance and furthermore whether a firm is confronted with more or 
less  severe  market  imperfections.  A  good  way  to  differentiate  would  be  to  interact  the 
indicator for the availability of internal funds like cash flow with a time-varying variable 
proxying relevant farm characteristics.  
In this study, we use the debt-to-capital ratio as an indicator of financial status. Accordingly, 
we first divide ex ante the observed Ukrainian farms into the two different financial regimes 
(constrained and unconstrained) applying two sample selection criteria from RIZOV (2004). 
The first sample selection criterion is that the firms with borrowing in two consecutive years 
hold  as  unconstrained,  while  the  dummy  X for  financial  constraints  equals  zero.  The 
remainder  are  constrained  firms  for  which  the  dummy X equals  one.  Thus,  the  a  priori 
constrained firms’ observations are considered  by additional regressors and denoted by  X . 
These  additional  regressors  should  indicate  the  difference  between  the  constrained  and 
unconstrained sub-sample (BOND and MEGHIR 1994). The second sample selection criterion is 
that  the  firms  receiving  credits  in  two  consecutive  years  and  non-negative  profits    are 
unconstrained.  Other  firms  are  held  as  constrained.  Hence,  variables  ) / ( K I X , 
2 ) / ( K I X , ) / ( K CF X , and ) / ( K Y X  denote the difference between the coefficients on each 
initial variable from equitation (8) across the two sub-samples.  
We doubt that two sample selection criteria used by RIZOV (2004) are sensitive enough to 
divide the farms exactly into constrained and unconstrained financial regimes. However, the 
less impact of cash flow in the unconstrained regime is expected by using the first criterion, 
which  enables  to  show  explicitly  all  the  farms  potentially  facing  soft  budget  constraints. 
Furthermore, the firms can be a priori classified as operating under the soft macroeconomic 
conditions if they receive some credit support irrespective of their financial situation. Our 
third sample separation criteria is that unconstrained farms borrow even after being classified 
as non-profitable in two consecutive years. SCHAFFER (1998) states that the SBC farms are 
those farms which receive credits facing both financial and economic distress. He defines 
economic  distress  as  a  present  negative  sum  of  sales  profit  plus  depreciation.  Financial 
distress is indicated by a negative profit before taxes. We concentrate on the financial distress 
indicator.  
4  ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY AND DATA  
Our  empirical  analyses  are  based  on  data  provided  by  the  State  Statistical  Committee  of 
Ukraine. This is an unbalanced panel data set collected from 700 agricultural enterprises in 
                                                 
4  We  are  aware  of  the  critique  on  monotonic  cash  flow-investment  relationship  provided  by  KAPLAN  and 
ZINGALES (1997). However, the discussion about sensitivity of investment to cash flow depending on different 
levels of the cost premium for external funds is left for future research.  
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three Ukrainian regions (oblasts) between 2001 and 2005. Available are 3426 observations 
from  Zhytomyr,  Cherkasy  and  Mykolayiv  oblasts  which  represent  different  natural  and 
economic zones of agricultural production. Zhytomyr region is located in the North, Cherkasy 
region in the Middle, and Mykolayiv region in the South of Ukraine. The variables for the 
econometric  estimation  are  calculated  from  the  annual  farms’  balance  sheets  and  income 
statements 
5. All variables were normalised by the value of capital stock and deflated by the 
respective price indexes for industry goods and agricultural products. Unfortunately, we could 
not obtain the regional price indexes to cover  financial characteristics of different oblasts. We 
expect, however, that those will be reflected in farm specific effects.  
Controlling for outliers reduced our sample from 700 to 636 farms. On average, between 2001 
and 2005 the observed farms carried out negative investments. This evidence of shrinking 
investment  should  be  taken  into  account  when  analysing  the  investment-financing 
relationship.  Here,  we  concentrate  our  analysis  on  the  positive  investment  observations 
( 0 ) / ( > it K I ) for which the Euler investment equitation is required to hold. Those are in total 
1443 observations from 529 farms, or 46 percent of the analysed sample. We abstract from 
the correction of the possible selection bias as POLDER and VERICK (2004) argue that these 
procedure may not be significant when explaining the positive investment path. 
The  standard  tests  give  evidence  on  significant  individual  effects  in  our  data  set
6.  In  all 
estimations, time dummy variables were included to control for time specific effects. In order 
to  sweep  out  the  individual  specific  effects  in  a  dynamic  panel  context  usually  first 
differencing is used. However, first differenced OLS is still biased. Hence, the most efficient 
estimator, Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) should be applied. The first-differenced 
GMM estimator (ARELLANO and BOND 1991) is based on removing individual effects and 
then  performing  a  modified  instrumental  variables  procedure.  This  estimation  method 
requires the validity of crucial assumptions about no second-order autocorrelation of the error 
terms ( t i, e D ). As the lagged regressors are not correlated with remaining disturbances but 
potentially can be predetermined by some past events, their second and  higher order lags are 
valid instruments for equation in differences. An improved GMM estimator called ‘system 
GMM’ (BLUNDELL and BOND 1998), additionally uses the respective lagged differences as 
instruments for the level equations. The latter significantly improves the results in case of 
weak initial instruments and short panels. Both first-differenced and system GMM estimates 
can  be  corrected  for  heteroscedasticity  (two-step  GMM).  It  is  reasonable  to  consider  the 
estimated coefficients from the first step because of possible distortions of standard errors. 
We expect that system GMM estimator provides more satisfactory results to be confirmed by 
the Hansen (Sargan) test for overidentifying restrictions. This test is a standard one which 
proves  the  orthogonality  conditions  for  instruments  involved  in  the  GMM  estimation. 
Additionally, we test the sample for absence of second-order autocorrelation
7. Besides the 
model specification for the whole sample described by equation (8), we also estimate the 
model with different financial regimes. The constructed  X -regressors are endogenous. Thus, 
these are also instrumented using second and higher order lags.  
5  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The used sample covers 529 farms over five years. The overidentifying restrictions associated 
with the empirical model are not rejected by the data. In table 2 we present the results derived 
                                                 
5 Detailed description of the variables calculation is available on request from the authors.  
6 Under usual tests are meant Hausman specification test, Breush-Pagan (Lagrange Multiplier) test for random 
effects, and F-test for fixed effects. For future details, see BALTAGI (2001). We use STATA 9. 
7 See ARELLANO and BOND (1991).     
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by using the system GMM estimator as those are more satisfactory. For each variation of the 
Euler equation the results of the unconstrained and constrained sub-sample are given.  
We start with the whole sample without selection and analyse parameter values from the 
model specification without and with debt variable. The positive coefficients of the lagged 
cash  flow  from  the  second  and  third  column  of  table  2  confirm  the  strong  investment-
financing relationship across the farms and, therefore, binding liquidity constraints. The small 
coefficients  of  the  squared  investment  term  indicate  that  under  unstable  macroeconomic 
conditions (non-transparent agricultural policy, high inflation rates, price fluctuations etc.), 
farms use large discount rates in investment planning ( 1 1 > + t f ). Admittedly, BOND and VAN 
REENEN (2003) argue that the unobserved heterogeneity of the real discount factor on new 
investment  f  complicates the parameter estimation in the Euler investment equation. This 
heterogeneity  in  f   can  reflect  the  differences  in  the  structure  of  capital  assets  used  by 
different farms, or the differences in the required rates of return. Small and non-significant 
positive  coefficients  of  the  output-capital  ratio  cannot  confirm  the  evidence  of  imperfect 
competition on agricultural product markets in Ukraine and non-constant returns to scale, at 
least  for  the  model  specification  without  sample  selection.  Introducing  the  debt-to-capital 
ratio improves the model specification indicated by the value of the Hansen (Sargan) test. The 
coefficient on this variable is positive and significant, which indicates a strong relationship 
between investment and availability of external financing.  
Financial constraints are further investigated by the ex ante sample division into the different 
financial regimes. We first estimate the parameter with two sample selection criteria referring 
to RIZOV (2004). In both cases the results on the cash flow parameter shown in the fourth and 
fifth column of table 2 have the following signs:  0 3 ³ b  for the a priori constrained sample of 
farms, and, surprisingly,  0 3 > b  for the unconstrained sample. However, as expected, less 
impact of financial variable is revealed by using the first criteria, which ex ante selects all the 
farms potentially facing SBC into the unconstrained sub-sample. The analysed data indicate 
that a priori constrained farms have low investment rates or even disinvest. As no credits are 
required for the investment expenditures, this diminishes the role of cash flow as proxy for net 
worth (collateral). Profits are mainly used to cover variable costs, or in order to distribute 
among farm managers and owners.  
For further explanation, we can use the free cash flow concept developed by JENSEN (1986). 
Free cash flow is “cash flow in excess required to fund all projects that have positive net 
present values discounted at the relevant cost of capital”. Observed positive links between 
investment  spending  and  internal  finance  in  unconstrained  regime  may  reflect  some 
manager’s decisions to ignore signals from market valuation in favour of overinvestment.  
Table 2:  GMM  estimates  of  the  Euler  investment  equation  with  sample  selection:                 
529 farms, 2001-2005  
Parameter  Without  
debt 

















































5 b     0.1463** 
(0.0573) 
     
Constrained sub-sample 
























m2 test  0.272  0.397  0.503  0.295  0.186 
Hansen (Sargan)  
test 
             
0.535 
              
0.561 
             
0.094 
              
0.276 
             
0.900 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. All equations include time dummies. ***, **, and *  
denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. p-values of the Wald test for joint 
significance  of  regressors  are  not  higher  than  5%.  m2  test  is  the  test  for  absence  of  second-order 
autocorrelation, and Hansen (Sargan) test is the test for overidentifying restrictions. 
Source: Own calculations based on data set provided by the State Statistical Committee of Ukraine  
Also,  managers  may  invest  in  non-value  maximising  activities  (e.g.,  expensive  cars  or 
offices). Otherwise, current profits may not play the crucial role in investment decisions if 
they are used for dividend payments, for distribution between some managers or even for 
social consumption. Unfortunately, we are not able to clarify specific financial goals for every 
analysed farm because of lack in required qualitative data. Thus, the certain levels of free cash 
flow raise farms expenditures independent of expected future profitability. This could be the 
reason  why  the  positive  correlation  between  cash  flow  and  investment  is  weak  or  non-
significant in a priori constrained sub-sample. Similar argumentation can be found in KAPLAN 
and ZINGALES (1997). HUBBARD (1998) explains the increase of capital demand which is 
supported by our data. Ex ante unconstrained firms invest more on average and, therefore, 
need an additional capital volume for growing. If their demand can be covered by debt capital, 
the availability of internal finance (vs. collateral) is required. Hence, the role of cash flow in 
receiving credits is significant at the higher level for the unconstrained sub-sample, expressed 
in terms of a positive cash flow parameter in the investment equation. Consequently, farms 
defined  as  unconstrained  according  to  the  second  sample  separation  criterion  are  in  fact 
constrained  because  of  an  excessive  demand  for  capital.  Therefore,  when  explaining 
investment decisions, it is important to consider carefully which farms are really constrained 
and hence, farm classification becomes crucial. 
With  respect  to  farms  being  constrained,  besides  no  access  to  credit,  they  must  exhibit 
demand for credit. Farms without credit are not really constrained, even though they do not 
borrow. However, it is difficult to measure the level of the farms’ real investment demand 
which has to be compared with the current state of financing across a priori constrained sub-
sample.  Also,  we  can  hardly  distinguish  ex  ante  between  the  really  constrained  and 
unconstrained farms among those which receive credits in consecutive years. We mentioned 
before that enterprises in transition give evidence of high investment demand for structural 
improvements  that  is  confronted  with  low  funds  supply  on  the  underdeveloped  capital 
markets. Therefore, Ukrainian farms can be classified as credit constrained in two cases. In 
the first case, a farm does not receive credits at all, which coincides with our first sample  
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separation criteria. The second case occurs when a profitable farm does not have sufficient 
credit access. Accordingly, the group of constrained farms should consist of those from the 
first case plus farms from the a priori unconstrained sample due to second sample separation 
criteria. A way to test for soft budget constraints will be then to look exactly at a sub-sample 
where farms receive credits but also make losses. Thus, the third criterion in our analysis is 
that the farms with negative profits and borrowing in two consecutive years operate in the soft 
macroeconomic environment.  
With respect to this criteria, about ten percent of the observations belong to the unconstrained 
regime. Indeed, the estimation results, shown in the last column of table 2, confirm the correct 
testing for SBC. The model is now able to differentiate better between two financial regimes. 
The cash flow coefficient is negative in a priori unconstrained sub-sample and positive in 
constrained  sub-sample.  In  other  words,  the  empirical  results  on  the  finance-investment 
relationship  confirm  the  SBC  hypothesis  for  a  small  part  of  the  Ukrainian  large  farms 
operating in relaxed financial regime. While unconstrained farms reveal the strong evidence 
of soft financial environment, the major part of observed farms face credit constraints. The 
empirical results presented here do not pretend to build an unique opinion on the level and 
implications of financial discipline in the large farms. On one hand, these farms may have 
easier access to credit as well as to the input and output markets. Such advantages are due to 
lower  transaction  costs  and  more  initial  wealth  for  self-financing  in  comparison  to  small 
farms. On the other hand, weak financial discipline in unconstrained (unprofitable) farms in 
connection with credit rationing among constrained farms endangers the tendency of capital 
misallocation  in  rural  areas.  This  induces  a  comparatively  slow  and  inefficient  structural 
change in Ukrainian agriculture.  
6  CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this paper we aimed to analyse the linkages between investment and financing constraints 
in Ukrainian large farms. For this purpose the Euler investment equation approach was used. 
The empirical results for both model settings, without and with sample separation, reject the 
hypothesis of a perfect capital market in the large farm sector of Ukraine. The results from the 
separated samples confirm the presence of either credit rationing and soft budget constraints. 
The positive cash flow coefficient for farms which are ex ante financially constrained gives 
evidence of credit rationing. The negative cash flow parameter for farms which are defined as 
being a priori financially unconstrained indicates the presence of SBC. Those farms invest 
even though being unprofitable during consecutive years and do thereby not rely on equity 
capital.  However,  our  hypothesis  about  a  soft  macroeconomic  environment  (soft  budget 
constraints)  is  only  supported  for  a  small  part  of  observed  farms.  This  shows  that  the 
appropriate sample separation is an important factor when explaining investment behaviour 
with financial constraints. For these results the sample separation is based on financial distress 
indicator,  however,  additional  sample  separation  criteria  failed  in  attempting  a  correct 
indication of the financial regimes.  
The  dual  existence  of  soft  budget  constraints  and  credit  rationing  in  large  farm  sector 
endangers  the  tendency  of  the  wrong  capital  allocation  and  slow  structural  change  in 
Ukrainian agriculture. Nevertheless, it is a rather speculative question if unprofitable farms 
should be liquidated. The large farm sector absorbs a considerable share of labour indicating 
hidden unemployment. Thus, former state and collective farms are still playing the role of a 
social buffer in rural areas and cannot be liquidated in the case of serious financial problems. 
An  alternative  way  is  the  step-by-step  acquisition  of  the  SBC  farms  by  more  successful 
agricultural enterprises. Moreover, the establishment of a sound banking system may help to 
increase supply of external capital to the farms. In particular, rationed farms benefit from an  
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improved  capital  access.  However,  these  farms  should  learn  how  to  signal  their  financial 
wealth in order to receive credit. In the credit rationing equilibrium, the banks sorting among 
potential borrowers do not implicitly choose those loans with the highest total returns, which 
implies welfare loses. When credit is restricted, not necessarily the projects with the lowest 
return are terminated. Thus, banks need to develop an appropriate credit rating system to 
choose appropriate borrowers. Another source of external finance could be direct investment 
which  may  support  the  farms  with  financial  constraints,  but  may  also  facilitate  ‘soft’ 
takeovers of SBC farms.  
For all that, direct investment is still hindered in the agricultural sector of Ukraine because of 
complicated  bureaucratic  procedures,  the  slow  land  market  reform,  and  substantial  price 
fluctuations  on  agricultural  input  and  output  markets.  Going  further  into  the  problem  of 
financial  constraints,  financial  and  sectoral  development  in  transition  process  are  directly 
influenced by the level of the macroeconomic and political stability. In this context, the state 
plays a crucial role in fostering sustainable business environment and regulatory framework 
for  Ukrainian  agriculture.  Moreover,  the  state  invisible  hand  is  needed  for  non-farm 
employment  diversification  and  infrastructure  development  in  rural  areas.  These  strategic 
policy objectives along with detailed macroeconomic evaluation of the both phenomena in 
Ukrainian agriculture, credit rationing and soft budget constraints, is an important issue for 
future empirical research. 
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